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ROBERTO BARATTA
PROFESSORE ORDINARIO NELL’UNIVERSITA` DI MACERATA (*)
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN PERSONAL AND FAMILY STATUS:
A RIGHTS BASED PERSPECTIVE
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. Respect for individual rights to both private and family life
and recognition (and enforcement) of foreign judgments. – 3. Fundamental rights
impact over national provisions. – 4. Focusing the concerns of human rights upon
recognition of family status duly acquired abroad. – 5. Conclusions.
1. International human rights law has been developing in many direc-
tions, including family law. The close tie between the law and the global
society in which it operates (1) means that family law has to be in harmony
with the prevailing set of international legal standards. Yet, respect for
human rights as defined by international conventions, courts and practi-
ces, challenges legislative choices in family law, (2) insofar as family law
enshrines the basic ethical principles of the national community. Delicate
problems of harmonization, if not moments of tension, between national
(*) This article was subject to independent external peer review.
(1) See generally BOBBIO, L’eta` dei diritti, Torino, 1992, p. XVI (suggesting a historical
perspective of human rights).
(2) There is a clear incidence of human rights on national models of family law, as well
as on the underlying ethical values, if one looks at the European Court of human rights case
law. The Court has affirmed the equality between children born in and children born out of
wedlock as regards their civil rights (Marckx v. Belgium, Application No 6833/74, judgment
of 13 June 1979; Mazurek v. France, Application No 34406/97, judgment of 1 May 2000).
Weighty reasons have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of
birth out of wedlock can be regarded as compatible with the Convention (see, mutatis
mutandis, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, Application Nos
9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985, § 78, and the Inze v. Austria,
Application No 8695/79, judgment of 28 October 1987, § 38 and 41). The European Court
has also upheld the right of a transsexual person to get the indication of her sex to be
corrected in the civil status register and on her official identity documents – B. v. France,
Application No 13343/87, judgment of 25 March 1992 – as well as his/her right to marry
according to Art. 12 ECHR – C. Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application No 28957/
95, judgment of 11 July 2002, § 71 ff.
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 2/2016
and international standards can arise. This disharmony may even call into
question the values underlying national and international laws. (3)
The out-of-wedlock or same-sex family models present in some States
particular antinomies. The European system for the protection of human
rights, based in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
enlarged the scope of the family concept so as to also embrace stable
relationships between unmarried persons. (4) The same holds true under
the EU integration process. (5) Thus, the family out of wedlock falls no-
wadays within the scope of international human rights. Yet, at the time of
writing, its implications are still challenging the political and social life of
some States in an unexpected way, unforeseeable up to a few decades
ago. (6)
In any case, international human rights law, though not precluding the
extension of marriage to same-sex relationships, (7) does not impose such
an obligation on States. (8) It is hardly a surprise. International human
(3) This paper utilizes the term State to define a legal order. The Author is aware that
the notion of a State in public international law may or may not coincide with a single law
district in the sense of the conflict of laws, such as a federal State in which territorial units
have different systems of law in respect of family law. However, that simplified language is
here preferred given that international obligations are usually addressed to a State entity as a
whole, including the composite one having different systems of law for the purpose of
family law.
(4) BARATTA, Verso la “comunitarizzazione” dei principi fondamentali del diritto di fami-
glia, this Rivista, 2005, pp. 597-599.
(5) See however MENGOZZI, I problemi giuridici della famiglia a fronte del processo di
integrazione europea, in Fam. dir., 2004, p. 643 ff., at 645.
(6) As regards the Italian legal order, see Oliari and Others v. Italy, Applications Nos
18766/11 and 36030/11, judgment of 21 July 2015, whereby the ECtHR held that Italy has
violated Art. 8 ECHR because in essence the Italian legislature was unable to enact a civil
union legislation, either for homosexual couples or for heterosexual ones. Moreover, due to
a recent evolution of the Italian Constitutional Court, Italian legislation is even inconsistent
with its own Constitutional normative values (see infra, footnote 7).
(7) That happens in some legal orders, e.g. in Spain, France and Belgium, some
American States and Canada (Attorney General for Ontario v. M., Supreme Court of Canada
(1999) 4 LRC, 551): for a brief comparative perspective see OLIVETTI, I diritti fondamentali.
Lezioni, Foggia, 2015, p. 489 ff.
(8) BARATTA, Verso la “comunitarizzazione” cit., This approach has been confirmed in
Schalk and Kopf (Application No. 30141/04), judgment of 21 November 2010, § 101.
JAYAWICKRAMA, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law. National, regional and Inter-
national Jurisprudence, Cambridge 2002, p. 766 includes in the notion of family also de facto
ties. In Italy the institution of marriage is restricted to persons having different sex, though
the Italian Constitutional Court held that the legislature must set forth a law to govern same-
sex relationships, since they are “formazioni sociali” protected under Art. 2 Constitution
(Constitutional Court, 14 April 2010 No 138, this Rivista, 2010, p. 979 ff.; and 11 July No
170, § 5.5).
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rights do not purport to create a uniform law, but rather a minimum
standard above which national legal orders may choose different norma-
tive approaches. (9) Therefore, under international law, the notion of fa-
mily is not necessarily tied with the institution of marriage. (10) Reflecting
this trend, the Human Rights Committee acknowledges the existence of
various forms of family. (11)
Against this background, which does not exclude normative con-
flicts between domestic and international orders, family private interna-
tional law (PIL or conflict of laws) is no exception. (12) It would be
controversial to argue that fundamental rights do not concern it, and
namely conflict of laws rules because they do not deal with the substan-
ce of disputes. Certainly, in the past, a well-established opinion argued
that conflict of laws rules, built upon Savignian natural-law conception
of center of gravity (sitz), were neutral per se, being inherently value
impartial provisions due to their mechanical and formal way of functio-
ning. Such provisions, it was assumed, limited themselves to ensure a
mere allocation of jurisdiction to prescribe (and the power to adjudica-
te) to sovereign States without purporting to determine the concrete
issue between the parties, which was (and is) finally devolved to the
applicable law. Mirroring this leap in the dark or blind conception
underlying conflict of laws disciplines, a traditional formalistic reasoning
(9) JACOT-GUILLARMOD, Re`gles, me´thodes et principes d’interpre´tation dans la jurispru-
dence de la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme, in PETITTI, DECAUX, IMBERT (eds.), La
Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, Paris, 1999,
p. 50.
(10) COUSSIRAT-COUSTIE`RE, La notion de famille dans les jurisprudences de la Commission
et de la Cour europe´ennes des droits de l’homme, in Internationalisation des droits de l’homme
et e´volution du droit de la famille, Paris, 1996, p. 45 ff.; BRO¨TEL, Schutz des Familienleben’s,
in RabelsZ, 1999, p. 580 ff.; RUSSO, Art. 8, in La Convention europe´enne cit., pp. 305 ff.,
316 ff.
(11) HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, General Comment 19 Article 23 (Thirty-ninth session,
1990), § 2. For a sociological perspective, SEVE, LAZLO-FENOUILLET (eds.), La famille en
mutation, Paris, 2014, passim.
(12) Generally COHEN, La Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme et le droit
international prive´ frane¯ais, in Revue critique, 1989, p. 451 ff.; MATSCHER, Le droit interna-
tional prive´ face a` la Convention europe`enne des droits de l’homme, in Tr. com. fr. droit int.
prive´, 1996-97, p. 211 ff.; JAYME, Identite´ culturelle et inte´gration : le droit international prive´
postmoderne, in Recueil des cours, t. 251, 1995, pp. 49 ff., 228 f.; GAUDEMET-TALLON,
Nationalite´, statut personnel et droits de l’homme, in Festschrift fu¨r E. Jayme, Munich,
2004, p. 205 ff.; ROSSOLILLO, Identita` personale e diritto internazionale privato, Padova,
2009, p. 171 f.
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also featured in the debate over the internationalprivatrechtiliche Gerech-
tigkeit, as if PIL justice were essentially distributive in kind. (13)
These approaches, based in essence on a sort of PIL ideological neu-
trality, do not seem to fit the current trend of modern law anymore. Law is
not blind. Quite the contrary, it is capable of and is expected to pursue
normative values and ethical objectives, however imperfectly and belate-
dly. (14) Otherwise it would lose its necessary component of moral legiti-
macy. (15) Any internal legislative choice – and family PIL is hardly an
exception – may not be viewed as a mere logical axiom deprived of
underlying normative values, as it were structurally incapable of conflicting
with individuals’ fundamental rights. (16) The primary role of law, inclu-
ding the discipline of conflict of laws, is to achieve a fair regulation of the
needs of human society.
This is not to say that the double dimension, i.e. ethical and legal, of
the philosophic debate on law and justice, is incorrect. (17) The problem is
rather to enhance the debate on family PIL justice under a perspective ba-
sed on rights. Arguably, this discipline should be shaped and understood
(13) On this fruitful debate in conflict of laws KEGEL, Begriff- und Interessenjurispru-
denz im internationalen Privatrecht, in Festschrift H. Lewald, Basel, 1953, p. 259 ff., at 270
ff.; ID., Internationales Privatrecht, Mu¨nchen, Berlin, 1987, p. 80 ff.; BEITZKE, Betrachtungen
zur Methodik im internationalen Privatrrecht, in Festgabe Smend, Go¨ttingen, 1952, p. 1 ff., at
16 ff.; BATIFFOL, Les inte´reˆts en droit international prive´, in Festschrift fu¨r Gerhard Kegel,
Frankfurt am Main, 1977, p. 11 ff.; QUADRI, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato, Napoli,
1969, p. 133 f. For a critical approach to that doctrine see Bucher, Grundfragen der
Anknu¨pfungsgerechtigkeit im internationalen Privatrecht, Basel, 1975, p. 27 ff.; JUENGER,
Zum Wandel des internationalen Privatrechts, Karlsruhe, 1974, p. 8 ff.; PATOCCHI, Re`gles
de rattachement localisatrices et re`gles de rattachement a` caracte`re substantiel, Gene´ve, 1985,
p. 216 ff.
(14) ROMANO, Frammenti di un dizionario giuridico, Milano, 1983, p. 64 ff.; HART, The
Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, p. 155 ff.; MACCORMICK, Institutions of Law. An Essay in
Legal Theory, Oxford, 2007, p. 263 ff., and as regards a philosophic approach on justice and
respect for human rights SEN, The Idea of Justice, London, 2009, p. 355 ff.
(15) Theoretically, as argued by HABERMAS, Fatti e norme. Contributi a una teoria
discorsiva del diritto e della democrazia, Milano, 1996, p. 130, “un ordinamento giuridico
puo` essere legittimo solo se non contraddice principi morali. Tramite la componente di
legittimita` della validita` giuridica, il diritto positivo porta sempre con se´ un incancellabile
riferimento alla morale”.
(16) Similarly, even jurisdictional rules may violate fundamental rights. For instance,
matrimonial proceedings may tilt the scale of jurisdictional bases (i.e. personal connecting
factors) in favor of the husband so as to prefer his domicile or habitual residence. It would
be hardly convincing to argue that this treatment of proceedings for divorce and judicial
separation is sound, and does not imply discrimination against the wife, because it does not
purport to determine the litigation between the parties.
(17) GREENBERG, How to Explain Things with Force, in Harvard Law Rev., 2016 and
SCHAUER, How (and if) Law Matters, ivi, p. 350 ff.
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as a means to pursue the fundamental rights of the individual persons
concerned. (18) It should ensure, in family matters, the continuity of per-
sonal and family status, i.e. the possession d’e´tat beyond a purely national
dimension. As we will tentatively explain infra, this is the main purpose of
this paper. In that perspective, the so-called PIL distributive justice cannot
but have a secondary and indirect role since the ‘law’ could and should
pursue and positively protect ethical values as enshrined in international
human rights instruments. (19)
Against this background, the present paper seeks to sketch a human
rights perspective in family PIL (section 4). However, as necessary points
of departure, it focuses first on the individual rights that are relevant in
such a field (section 2); secondly, while considering international cases and
practice, it addresses the impact of fundamental rights on national provi-
sions relating to recognition of foreign judgments and public acts (section
3). Some conclusions will be then drawn (section 5).
2. As we will see in the next section, it is a fact that family conflict of
laws as a whole can indeed collide with the protection for fundamental
rights as guaranteed by international conventions. (20) What are the rele-
vant rights in this regard? As is known, respect for individual rights to both
private and family life is at the core of this analysis. (21)
These rights date back to 1948 in Articles 12 and 29(2) of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, (22) which is a milestone in human
(18) The Greek philosopher Plato thought that “il problema del giusto e`… problema
dello Stato giusto, e lo Stato giusto non e` tale se non in quanto sia vivente nella coscienza di
ciascuno come valore super individuale” (ABBAGNANO, Introduzione, in PLATONE, Dialoghi
Politici. Lettere, I, Repubblica, Timeo, Crizia, Politico, Torino, 1988, p. 28).
(19) For a different approach cf. DICEY, MORRIS et COLLINS, The conflict of Laws, 14e
ed., London, 2006, p. 4 ff., and CLARKSON, HILL, The Conflict of Laws, Oxford, 2006, p. 6.
(20) Family as a group unit of society is protected by virtue of several international
instruments: e.g. Universal Declaration of human rights, Art. 16(1) and International Co-
venant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 23(1).
(21) Even though directly stating that everyone enjoys a right to private and family life
would have been simpler, it has been convincingly argued that the idea of respect is pivotal
in the field of personal law (EEKELAAR, Family Law and Personal Life, Oxford, 2006, p.
77 ff.)
(22) Art. 12 reads: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”; and Art.
29(2): “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”.
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rights history. (23) They are currently enshrined, as far as European instru-
ments are concerned, in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (“CFR”), (24) as well as in Article 8(1) of the
ECHR. (25) Although they are formally divided, the distinction between
the respect for the right to private life, on the one hand, and that to family
life, on the other hand, is not clear-cut. (26) As regards family law, certain
situations such as registration of marriages (27) and childbirth, (28) may be
examined under both: while the right to know the origin of an adopted
person has often been dealt with as regarding his private life alone, (29)
others, such as the nullification of marriage, are conceived as having im-
plications for both the applicant’s family and private status. (30) The Eu-
ropean organs have explained that, although the right to adopt is not, as
such, included among the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the relations-
hip between the adoptive and the adoptee is in principle of the same
nature as the family relations protected by Article 8; for the adoption
orders confer the same rights and obligations as those of a father or
mother in respect of a child born in lawful wedlock. (31)
(23) The Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris
on 10 December 1948 General Assembly Resolution No 217 A, as a common standard of
achievements for all peoples and all nations.
(24) “Everyone has the right to the protection for his or her private and family life,
home and communications”.
(25) “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life”. On the drafting
history of Art. 8 see SCHABAS, The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary,
Oxford, 2015 p. 358 ff. As it is known, although concluded in multilateral treaties that are
binding on the states parties, a set of human rights has acquired a customary status in
international law. Human rights could also be considered to form part of the ‘general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ within the meaning of Art. 38(1)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (MERON, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Norms as Customary Law, Oxford, 1989, p. 79 ff.; SIMMA & ALSTON, The Sources of Human
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, in Aust. Yearb Int. Law, 1988/89,
p. 102 ff.). Given the scope of this paper and that the different nature of the source of
international law do not change in structural terms the reasoning of the approach here
suggested, that issue has not been dealt with.
(26) SUDRE, Droit europe´en et international des droits de l’homme, 6e ed., Paris, 2003, p.
372 ff.
(27) Dadouch v. Malta, Application No 38816/07, judgment of 20 July 2010, § 48.
(28) Hanzelkovi v. The Czech Republic, Application No 43643/10, judgment of 11
December 2014, § 67.
(29) Odie`vre v. France, Application No 42326/98, judgment of 13 February 2003 § 28.
(30) Benes v. Austria, Application No 18643/91, decision of European Commission on
human rights of 6 January 1992.
(31) Pini et autres v. Roumanie, Application nos 78028/01 and 7803001/01, judgment
of 22 June 2004 §§ 140-142.
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Although international instruments prevent States and public autho-
rities from interfering with the rights for private and family life, these are
not absolute rights, as they are subject to limitations and conditions. (32) In
particular, Article 8(2) ECHR allows national restrictions on the protec-
tion of such rights provided that three cumulative conditions, which are
usually examined in sequence, are fulfilled. First, public intervention must
be made in accordance with the law (or prescribed by law). Secondly,
national measures cannot but pursue predetermined legitimate aims,
which in short encompass, insofar as family law is concerned, the protec-
tion of the community health and morals, the fundamental rights of other
persons and, where relevant, the child’s rights and freedoms, including his
best interests. (33) Thirdly, public authorities have to demonstrate that
interference is necessary in a democratic society. In short, States may
deviate from respecting private and family life rights insofar as their au-
thorities prove that a limitation is necessary and proportionate to the pur-
suance of specific legitimate aims set by the European Convention.
It is also worth noting that, taking into account the most relevant
judicial practice, fundamental rights interference with family PIL concerns
mainly the methodologies for securing recognition of foreign judgments
and public acts. Indeed, individuals can create a valid family or personal
status abroad (the State of origin) in order to subsequently demand its
recognition and enforcement in their national or habitual residential State
(the requested State). By doing so, they sometimes aim to circumvent the
prohibitions or restrictions of the lex fori that would have prevented them
from acquiring the same civil or personal status through the application of
the domestic law, including its conflict of law rules. (34) That occurs in
particular when the law of the requested State does not provide for the
(32) As to the limitation clauses laid down in Arts 8-11 ECHR (and Art. 2 of Protocol
No 4) and the relevant criteria for appraisal, see ARAI, The System of Restrictions, in VAN
DIJK, VAN HOOF, VAN RIJN, ZWAAK (eds.) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Antwerpen-Oxford, 2006, p. 333 ff.; SUDRE, Droit europe´en cit., p. 369 ff.
(33) See Art. 8(2) ECHR, as well as case law cited infra.
(34) In that regard the Wagner case is illustrative (ECtHR, case of Wagner and
J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, Application No 76240/01, judgment of 28 June 2007; the case
is partially reported also in Revue critique, with a comment by KINSCH). Ms Wagner could
not adopt a child in Luxembourg, the State of her nationality, since, being not married, she
could not fulfill the conditions to adopt set forth in the national civil code that was
applicable under the Luxembourg system of PIL. Therefore, she chose to adopt a child
in Peru because this country permitted adoptions by unmarried woman. Hence, she aimed
to indirectly obtain abroad what was unable to achieve directly through an application to
adopt in Luxembourg (see in particular the judgment of the Luxembourg District Court of
2 June 1999, quoted in the Wagner case, at p. 8).
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examination of the merits of the application submitted to the foreign
court, but restricts itself to verifying that the decision delivered abroad
satisfies some international procedural requirements, such as the interna-
tional jurisdiction of the foreign court (usually according to the national
rules on jurisdiction) and respect for the fundamental public policies of
the forum. (35)
As judicial practice shows, from the standpoint of the requested State,
the issue is to assess whether it is possible not only to let a foreign decision
produce effects in the domestic legal order, but also to declare it enfor-
ceable. For the ultimate objective quite often is to get an order for entering
the civil status duly acquired in the State of origin into the public registry
of the State in which the concerned individual is a national or has his
domicile (or habitual residence). Enforcement of a foreign civil status
seeks not only to establish the personal tie or to integrate an individual
in a family group, but it is often sought in order to secure inheritance
rights between the individuals concerned, and sometimes also to permit to
one of them to acquire the nationality of the other so as to get inter alia a
definitive leave to remain in the requested State.
Needless to say that, as a part of the legal system of the requested
State, the normative approaches to the civil law effects accorded to foreign
judgments or acts issued by an external authority, may vary from one
country to another. As is known, they may be automatic or, as they often
do, provide for judicial proceedings charged to assess whether some re-
quirements for recognition and enforcement have been met. Under a
conflict of laws perspective, procedures aimed at securing civil effects to
foreign decisions ought to be conceived as alternative conflict techniques
(35) One could attempt to reduce inconsistencies by virtue of a domestic Constitutional
approach assuming that it is capable of embracing fundamental values and rights. This
would be inadequate when the constitutional rights show inconsistencies with international
human rights. In fact, the point of view of the requested State cannot be coordinated with a
foreign personal and family status when its constitutional values collide with the respect for
rights to private and family life as internationally guaranteed. For instance, in cases concer-
ning the recognition and enforcement of adoption orders duly issued abroad, Luxembourg
courts did also examine the conformity of the lex fori with the national Constitution and, in
short, concluded that the right to family life was not adversely affected. They assumed, on
the one hand, that adoption had its basis in positive law and not in natural law so as that the
legislation rightly permitted full adoption to married people which is the most advantageous
choice for the child; and on the other hand that a simple adoption was still available for the
persons concerned under the lex fori (see Wagner case cit., p. 6-11). For the very same
grounds, unconvincing would also be the approach advocating the safeguard of fundamen-
tal rights in methodological terms so that PIL could be capable of solving the problem by
having recourse to a specific method of conflict of laws.
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with respect to the traditional choice of law approach, which determine,
first, the jurisdiction of the national court and, second, the law which it
will apply. Such procedures do also seek to solve antinomies between
different legal orders. (36) It is self-evident that the failure to recognize
e.g. a decree concerning a family status granted in another State, creates
inevitably a limping family relationship, validly established in the State of
origin but not existing in the forum, with all the related inconveniences for
the persons concerned. Broadly speaking the overarching objective of PIL
techniques, including recognition methods, is to address and solve such
problems.
3. It is theoretically reasonable to advance a conflict of law rules
analysis based on a human rights perspective, i.e. an approach to this
discipline conceived in order to positively achieve the rights of the persons
concerned. (37) The basic assumption for this approach is to admit that,
like any other area of domestic law, PIL is capable of adversely affecting
the right to private life, the right to family life and even, in particular when
either a status filii or an adoption is concerned, the best interests of the
child, as they all are guaranteed by international human rights standards.
(36) Its main objective is the coordination of “pointes de vues concurrentes exprime´s
par des ordres e´tatiques, par de´finition he´te´roge`nes, sur la meˆme situation” (BARATTA, La
reconnaissance internationale des situations juridiques personnelles et familiales, in Recueil des
cours, t. 348, 2010, p. 271), namely when recognitions techniques require the respect of the
conflict of law rules of the required State (se also BUCHER, La famille en droit international
prive´, in Recueil des cours, t. 283, 2000, p. 51; QUIN˜ONES ESCA´MEZ, Proposition pour la
formation, la reconnaissance et l’efficacite´ internationale des unions conjugales ou de couple,
in Revue critique, 2007, p. 357 ff., at 365). It is all the more so if one considers that PIL,
given its different methods of conflict solving, should be defined by taking into account its
primary function, i.e. the solution of antinomies arising out from the functioning of different
legal orders concerning the same case of private law.
(37) A clear example of this is, under the EU provisions inspired by international
instruments, the Regulation No 2201/2003 whose provisions determine the power to adju-
dicate in matters of parental responsibility on the best interests of the child, showing inter
alia that this formula – sometimes considered of little or no actual legal value – is able to
assume substantial contours, since it imposes the related obligation on national authorities
(see Art. 15 Regulation). One may even recall, under the same Regulation, the discipline
concerning the rights of access which concerns the rights (and duties) of the parent that
does not enjoy the right of custody to have a personal relationship with the child on a
regular basis. It is conversely also a corresponding right of the child, his supreme interest
ending up to be a legal criterion for deciding cases. It follows that the EU, through these
provisions, has truly become a bearer of fundamental rights as the ECJ case law shows
(judgment of 11 July 2008, case C-195/08 PPU, Rinau; and 23 December 2009, case C-403/
09 PPU, Deticek v. Sgueglia,).
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Under any system of conflict of laws, a foreign judgment can be
prevented from producing effects if its recognition would be contrary to
some predetermined requirements. However, dismissing the enforcement
of a foreign judgment can represent an interference with the rights to
private and family life since it is a conduct that directly impairs the enjoy-
ment of the rights in question. (38) Let’s recall in passing that, as the
Pellegrini case shows, even enforcing a foreign decision can amount to a
violation of due process guarantees if the proceedings before the foreign
court that delivered the same decision did not comply with due process
according to Article 6 of the ECHR. (39)
(38) Ex multis Hussin v. Belgium, Application No 70807/01, judgment of 6 May 2004,
§ 5; Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Gre`ce, Application No 56759/08, judgement of 3 May 2011, §§
58-60.
(39) See Pellegrini v. Italy, Application No 30882/96, judgment of 20 October 2001. In
this case the applicant’s marriage was annulled by a decision of the Vatican courts, which
Italian judges declared enforceable in Italy. The European Court’s task consisted in exami-
ning whether the Italian judges, before authorizing enforcement of the decision annulling
the marriage, were duly satisfied that the relevant proceedings fulfilled the guarantees of
Art. 6 ECHR. According to the ECtHR, such a review is required when a foreign decision is
delivered from a judge of a non-Conventional country. In order to ascertain whether the
State party violates Art. 6 by enforcing a third State decision when the related proceedings
infringed the right to a fair hearing, reference has to be made to Art. 1 ECHR. This
provision points out that the Contracting States are bound to secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the ECHR. It seems a
truism to say that in Pellegrini the canon (or foreign) proceedings violating Art. 6 may not
be attributed to Italian courts. Actually, Italian courts, while recognizing foreign judgments,
exercise their own judicial functions, acting as autonomous organs. However, the responsi-
bility of Italy was at stake when its authorities took action having contributed, as a direct
consequence, to the exposure of an individual to a situation in breach of Art. 6, albeit it
occurred by a non-Conventional Party. This is a clear inference from Soering v. The United
Kingdom, Application No 14038/88, judgment of 7 July 1989, § 91. Similarly, the European
Court adopted the “co-operation criterion” in Drozd and Janousek, according to which “The
Contracting States are obliged to refuse their co-operation if it emerges that the conviction is
the result of a flagrant denial of justice” (Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Appli-
cation No 12747/87, judgment of 26 June 1992, § 110). In short, Italian courts should not
have contributed to such a violation by enforcing a canonical judgment whose proceedings
violated the right to a fair hearing under the meaning of Art. 6 § 1. Pellegrini clearly entails
this conclusion (BARATTA, Scioglimento e invalidita` del matrimonio nel diritto internazionale
privato, Milano, 2004, p. 204 ff.). The Strasbourg Court held that Italian courts breached
their duty of satisfying themselves, before authorizing enforcement of the Roman Rota’s
judgment, that the applicant had had a fair trial in the proceedings under canon law. As a
matter of fact, the adversarial principle was undermined before the ecclesiastic court.
Arguably, ensuring the right to a fair trial is a matter of application of international con-
ventions on human rights and, therefore, of Art. 6, these treaties having been enacted in the
Italian legal order. When ascertaining the applicability of Art. 6, it is at first necessary to
assess the full meaning of this result. Clearly, one may assume that according to Pellegrini,
Art. 6 § 1 establishes legal criteria applicable when a Convention Party enforces a decision
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Usually, recognition or enforcement is subject to the double condition
that the foreign court should have exerted jurisdiction according to the
same criteria adopted by the national system of PIL, and that the foreign
authority delivering the judgment complied with the conflict of law rules
of the forum. Most of all, PIL systems concerning recognition (and en-
forcement) of foreign judgments lay out that national authorities retain an
overriding power to rely on the doctrine of ordre public, a manifest and
serious harm to the fundamental national principles of justice or morals
characterizing the national legal order, to block recognition of foreign
decisions (and other public acts). For instance, such an attitude exists
towards surrogacy practices: some European countries are contrary to
couples travelling abroad with the purpose of entering a surrogacy arran-
gement and returning home with a child, deeming surrogacy as incompa-
tible with national public policy. (40) In fact, the need to respect the
conflict of laws rules of the forum prevents the recognition of the related
coming from a non-Conventional State (as well as, I would add incidentally, a decision
coming from a Convention State). Moreover, the European Court did state that Italian
courts should have been ‘duly satisfied’ that the foreign proceeding ‘fulfilled the guarantees
of article 6’ (§ 40 of Pellegrini). Consequently, the Italian courts must not enforce foreign
civil judgments when the relevant proceedings did not satisfy the right to a fair trial within
the scope of Art. 6. Yet Pellegrini yields only unclear, or at least partial, answers on that
respect, since it does not add indications about the nature and extent of the obligations
arising out Art. 6 when giving effect to a canonical judgment in Italy. A distinguished
scholar construed the last mentioned sentence of Pellegrini as an overcoming of Soering
and Drozd and Janousek cases (COSTA, Osservazioni sulla sentenza della Corte europea dei
diritti dell’uomo nel caso Pellegrini c. Italia, in Riv. int. dir. dell’uomo, 2002, p. 435 ff., at
437). Before saying that the European Court case law shows inconsistencies, or concluding
that Italian courts should adopt the “all requirements of Article 6” test, one might look at
the same issue from a different perspective. Indeed, it may be submitted that in Pellegrini
the European Court did not mention the “flagrant denial of justice” test adopted in Soering,
Drodz as well as in Iribarne Perez simply because in Pellegrini the canon proceedings implied
such a serious infringement of the right to a fair trial that recognizing the Ecclesiastical
decision doubtless amounted to a clear and flagrant denial of justice. In the instant case of
Pellegrini there was no doubt that the applicant had not had the possibility of examining the
evidence produced by her husband and by the witnesses (§ 44). Further, the applicant was
not in a position enabling her to secure the assistance of a lawyer and was summoned to
appear before the Ecclesiastic Court without knowing what the case was about (§ 46).
(40) National attitudes towards surrogacy arrangements are different. These are pro-
hibited, sometimes even via criminal sanctions (France, Switzerland and Italy). In other
countries surrogacy practices are lawful under strict legal conditions, even imposing altru-
istic purpose (The Netherlands and United Kingdom). Sometimes they are tolerated (Po-
land and Belgium). In some legal orders surrogacy arrangements are exploited for commer-
cial goals (Georgia, Ukraine and Russia): cf. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy, No. 10 of
March 2012, p. 9 ff.; TRIMMINGS, BEAUMONT (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements:
Legal Regulation at the International Level, Oxford, 2012, passim.
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civil status established in the country of origin. Indeed, such a course of
action is considered as a means to circumvent the national rules on inter-
national adoptions. Likewise, it may also turn out to be inconsistent with a
number of legal requirements, were the application downgraded as one of
recognition of a foreign adoption. (41)
These PIL provisions fall squarely under the scrutiny of international
human rights bodies. States are not free to rely on national provisions
when enacting proceedings on whether to confer effects to a family status
duly acquired abroad. A survey of international case law shows that it is
relatively easy to demonstrate the lawfulness of a given restriction (pre-
scribed by law) and its pursuance of legitimate aims. (42) Yet, as discussed,
respect for the rights to private and family life, as internationally guaran-
teed, protect individuals claiming the existence of a family tie legally
acquired abroad unless a restriction is necessary in a democratic society
and proportionate to the pursuance of a legitimate interest.
This very third standard is challenging to prove: international judges,
and namely in Europe the ECtHR, scrutinize it rigorously, interprets it
narrowly and admits it only if convincingly established. (43) The notion of
necessity (in a democratic society) implies that the interference, i.e. the
refusal to recognize a family status acquired abroad, has to be grounded
on a qualified national social need, which must be vital and proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued by the public authority. (44) In that respect,
ECtHR has construed the “margin of appreciation” doctrine: mirroring
the subsidiary nature of the international protection of human rights, it is
usually conceived as an interpretative instrument deferring to areas of
national self-determination. (45)
(41) VONK, BOELE-WOELKI, Surrogacy and Same-sex Couples in The Netherlands, in
BOELE-WOELKI, FUCHS (eds.). Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. Natio-
nal, Cross-Border and European Perspectives, 2nd ed., 2012, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland,
p. 123 ff.
(42) This can be explained by the fact that domestic systems of PIL are often enshrined
in statutes or have a long case law tradition reflecting a legal order that is committed to
democratic principles and rule of law standards.
(43) Generally, ARAI, The System of Restrictions cit., p. 335.
(44) See e.g.Wagner et J.M.W.L v. Luxembourg cit., § 124; and Negrepontis-Giannisis v.
Gre`ce cit., § 61. PIRRONE, Limiti e conto-limiti alla circolazione dei giudicati nella giurispru-
denza della Corte europea dei diritti umani: il caso Wagner, in Dir. umani e dir. int., 2009, p.
251 ff.
(45) ARAI-TAKAHASHI, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Propor-
tionality in the ECHR, Cambridge, 2002, passim; LUGATO, Sulla sussidiarieta` in diritto
internazionale, in Archivio Giur., 2011, p. 3 ff.; ID., The margin of appreciation and freedom
of religion: between treaty interpretation and subsidiarity, in Journ. Catholic Legal Studies,
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All in all, in the field of family PIL, States are allowed to have recourse
to their own requirements in order to preserve some legitimate public aims,
such as, in particular, rights and freedoms of the concerned persons,
health and morals, public policy. However, according to a well-established
case law of the ECtHR, the sphere of appreciation left to public authori-
ties in shaping their own limitations to fundamental rights varies in rela-
tion to the circumstances, the matter and the background of the case.
Moreover, the presence or absence of a common denominator among
the laws of the Member States is a relevant factor in this regard. Broadly
speaking, that margin is relatively wide if there is no common ground (or
consensus) between the national laws. That is all the more true when the
case raises delicate ethical issues.
Therefore, international fundamental rights impacts on the national
systems that makes the recognition of foreign judgments (or public acts)
conditional on compliance with the conflict of laws rule of the forum. In
Wagner the European Court held that the national decision dismissing
enforcement of a Peruvian order of full adoption had not demonstrated
that such a result was necessary in a democratic society. (46) Highlighting
that the margin of appreciation was limited by the fact that adoption by
unmarried persons was permitted without restriction in most of the Con-
tracting States, (47) the European Court held that relying on the applica-
tion of the Luxembourg rules on the conflict of laws and, on that very
basis, refusing enforcement, was inconsistent with the right to family life of
the persons concerned. In the Court’s eyes, that typical PIL approach
failed “to take account of the social reality of the situation”; therefore,
the applicants’ right to a family life encountered “obstacles in their daily
life and the child is not afforded legal protection” making it impossible to
be fully integrated into the adoptive family. (48) In addition, it disregarded
the best interests of the child and unduly let the conflict rules take pre-
2013, p. 49 ff.; BARTOLE, DE SENA, ZAGREBELSKY, Commenario breve alla CEDU, Padova,
2012, p. 308 ff.; LEGG, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law.
Deference and Proportionality, Oxford, 2012, p. 58 ff.
(46) In this case Luxembourg authorities dismissed an application for enforcement of a
Peruvian decree of full adoption because it was rendered contrary to the lex fori, which was
the applicable law according to the rule on the conflict of laws set forth in the Civil Code as
interpreted by Luxembourg courts. Although the Peruvian court was internationally com-
petent according to the rules of Luxembourg Civil Code, the application was rejected since
the adoptive mother, being an unmarried person, could not obtain a full adoption in
Luxembourg (see Wagner cit., p. 3 ff.).
(47) Ivi, § 129.
(48) Ivi, § 132.
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cedence over the social reality and the situation of the persons concer-
ned. (49)
Another perhaps even more illuminating example is the impact of
fundamental rights on the classic public policy exception. (50) Internatio-
nal case law shows that ensuring respect for individual rights implies that
such exception is limited at least by two factors. Consequently, a truly
international notion of public policy seems to emerge. (51)
i) Guaranteeing the identity of the individuals concerned
If denying recognition of a civil status duly acquired abroad affects an
important facet of individual identity, fundamental rights as internationally
guaranteed are deemed to have primacy over national normative policies.
As a result, States cannot claim their own ordre public as a bar to reco-
gnition. Respect for the right to private life requires that persons should be
able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which
includes filiation, (52) as well as a person’s name. (53) Similarly, respect for
(49) Ivi, § 133. BUREAU, MUIR WATT, Droit international prive´. t. II. Partie Spe´ciale,
Paris, 2007, p. 171, admits that respect for national conflict rules cannot impeach the
recognition of a family status concerning a child.
(50) As regards the impact of human rights on the public policy exception in general,
see MAYER, La Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme et l’application des normes
e´trange`res, in Revue critique, 1991, p. 651 ff.; HAMMJE, Droits fondamentaux et ordre public,
ibidem, 1997, p. 1 ff.; DE MIGUEL Asensio, Derechos humanos, diversidad cultural y derecho
internacional privado, in Rev. der. priv., 1998, p. 541 ff.; LEQUETTE, Le droit international
prive´ et les droits fondamentaux, in Liberte´ et droits fondamentaux, 13e e´d., Paris, 2007, p. 99
ff.; GANNAGE´, Le droit international prive´ a` l’e´preuve de la hie´rarchie des normes (l’exemple
du droit de la famille), in Revue critique, 2001, p. 1 ff.
(51) In this regard see CARBONE, I diritti della persona tra CEDU, diritto dell’Unione
europea e ordinamenti nazionali, in Dir. Un. eur., 2013, esp. pp. 15-17; FORTEAU, L’ordre
public “transnational” ou “re´ellement international”: l’ordre public face a` l’encheveˆtrement
croissant du droit international prive´ et du droit international public, in Journ. dr. int.,
2011, p. 3 ff., and also, BARILE, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato, 2a ed., Padova,
1980, p. 141 ff.
(52) Mennesson v. France, Application No 65192/11, judgment of 26 September 2014,
§ 80; Labasse´e cit., § 38, 59. Further in Mikulic´ the ECtHR acknowledged the child’s right
to have an identity. In this case a man evaded court proceedings by a mother and a child
who alleged his paternity. Although the European Court held that there was no family tie
between the child and the alleged father, it went on to decide that the child’s ‘private life’
includes to a certain degree the right to establish relationships with other human beings. So
the facts fell within Art. 8 and the Croatian procedural deficiencies were a violation of that
provision (Mikulic´ v. Croatia, Application No 53176/99, judgment of 7 February 2002,
§ 52).
(53) A person’s name is usually considered as a constituent element of his identity and
of his private life, the protection of which is enshrined in Art. 7 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union and in Art. 8 ECHR. Certainly, the latter does not
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the right to family life entails that national authorities cannot either rea-
sonably disregard the adoptive legal status validly created abroad and
corresponding to a family life under Article 8 of the Convention, or refuse
recognition of such a family tie existing de facto so as to dispense them-
selves from a concrete examination of the situation.
In Negrepontis-Giannisis, while stressing “la realite´” of the relationship
between “le reque´rant et son pe`re adoptif”, the Strasbourg Court held that
the grounds for invoking the ordre public exception, claimed by the Greek
Cassation Court in order to reject the recognition of an American adop-
tion, “ne re´pondent pas a` un besoin social impe´rieux. Ils ne sont donc pas
proportionne´s au but le´gitime poursuivi en ce qu’ils ont eu pour effet la
ne´gation du statut de fils adoptif du reque´rant”. (54)
ECtHR case law on the rights of children born through (international)
surrogacy arrangements is another telling example of this. (55) Admittedly,
States enjoy in principle a broad discretion since there is no consensus in
Europe on the lawfulness of this controversial practice. (56) Yet, it is worth
recalling that the ECtHR was not asked to dwell on that issue. The right
claimed before it concerned a child and its relationship with the biological
father, as well as with his intended mother.
For instance, in Mennesson the ECtHR pointed out that “regard
should also be had to the fact that an essential aspect of the identity of
refer to it explicitly, and to a person’s name, as a means of personal identification and a link
to a family either. However a person’s name concerns his or her private and family life (see
cases Burghartz v. Switzerland, Application No 16213/90, judgment of 22 February 1994, §
24; and Stjerna v. Finland, Application No 18131/91, judgment of 25 November 1994,
§ 37).
(54) Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Gre`ce cit., §§ 72-76.
(55) International surrogacy arrangements have been increasingly challenging PIL sy-
stems with respect, in particular, to the recognition of the civil status of the surrogate child
within the State of origin of the intended parents. Indeed, in many countries surrogacy
arrangements are prohibited (e.g. France, Spain and Italy), while in a more limited number
of States (such as for instance Ukraine and Russia) this practice is permitted. As a result, the
number of cross-border arrangements concluded in surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions, has
been increasing.
(56) In Mennesson cit., the ECtHR held that “States must in principle be afforded a
wide margin of appreciation regarding the decision not only whether or not to authorize this
method of assisted reproduction but also whether or not to recognise a legal parent-child
relationship between children legally conceived as a result of a surrogacy arrangement
abroad and the intended parents” (§ 79; see also § 78). See FULCHIRON, BIDAUD-GARON,
Reconnaissance ou reconstruction? A propos de la filiation des enfants ne´s par GPA, au
landemain des arreˆts Labasse´e, Mennesson et Campanelli-Paradiso de la Cour europe´enne
des droits de l’homme, in Revue critique, 2015, p. 1 ff.; BARATTA, Diritti fondamentali e
riconoscimento dello status filii in casi di maternita` surrogata: la primazia degli interessi del
minore, in Dir. umani dir. int., 2016, p. 309 ff.
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individuals is at stake where the legal parent-child relationship is concer-
ned. The margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the
present case therefore needs to be reduced”. (57) As a consequence, the
role of the ordre public exception shrinks accordingly. In that case, French
authorities claimed that under the lex fori surrogacy agreements were null
and void on grounds of public policy since that corresponds to the
“French conception of international public policy”. (58) However, in the
European Court’s vision, the margin of appreciation left to public autho-
rities in order to construe their own specific ordre public is restrained.
Indeed, that exception, which is specific to PIL, comes under the full
scrutiny of the international judge. ECtHR held that domestic courts have
to strike a fair balance between the public interests – i.e. the legitimate
aims indicated above – and the individual entitlement to respect for his
private and family life. The point of equilibrium is shifted towards the
need to guarantee the existence of the status filii, considered as an inherent
and crucial part of the individual personal identity. In this perspective, the
protection of national legitimate aims is downgraded. (59) In Mennesson
and Labasse´e the ECtHR held that the genetic tie between the child that
was conceived through the means of artificial insemination and the father
who gave his biological material for that purpose, could not be denied.
Therefore, it went on to decide that the child’s true paternity and paren-
thood had to be enforced in French public registers.
In cases regarding international surrogacy arrangements, the ECtHR
has not stated that right of a couple to become intended parents is a
primary right, whereas the Grand Chamber, outside the practice of sur-
rogacy, in some specific cases upheld the right of a couple to conceive a
child by making use of medically assisted procreation. (60) Rather the
(57) Mennesson cit., § 80.
(58) Mennesson cit., § 82.
(59) In the ECtHR’s reasoning, to define the margin of appreciation – as a notion
instrumental to what it is necessary in a democratic society – State enjoy a discretion
according to the circumstances, the subject matter, as well as the context. It also admits
that in this respect one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of
common ground between the laws of the States of the Council of Europe. Hence, it is wide
when there is no consensus between them and the case raises sensitive moral or ethical
issues. However, that margin is to be restricted when a basic facet of an individual’s
existence or identity is at stake (Labasse´e cit., § 56; Mennesson cit., § 77). Denying reco-
gnition of a filiation tie affects the identity of the person’s involved and namely that of the
child concerned. Consequently, the margin of appreciation is reduced (Labasse´e cit., § 58;
Mennesson cit., § 80; see also, respectively, §§ 60 and 81).
(60) In some cases, the ECtHR held that States disproportionately refused access to
artificial insemination facilities, when their policy fell outside any acceptable margin of
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European Court, in surrogacy cases, focused on the child primary right’s to
obtain respect for his private life: France infringed that right for having
ruled that the relevant American decisions were inconsistent with national
ordre public. The emphasis lies on the child’s primary need to have his
status filii recognized with respect to the biological father. The possession
of this status civilis, construed as a fundamental right of the child, seems to
be core of the European Court’s reasoning. (61) However, it rejected the
claims founded on the alleged violation of the right to respect of family
life. Actually, in Labasse´e and Mennesson, it stated that France struck a
sound balance between the individual rights and the interests of the State,
since the refusal to recognize the status acquired in the USA had not
denied the family the right to live in France as a group in some way
protected by the law. (62)
appreciation so that a fair balance was not struck between the competing public and private
interests involved. In such situations the Grand Chamber held that Art. 8 was violated,
upholding in fact the right of a couple to respect for their decision to be genetic parents
(Dickson v. United Kingdom, Application No 44362/04, judgment of 4 December 2007, §
66; Evans v. United Kingdom, Application No 6339/05, judgment of 10 April 2007, § 71-72.
(61) See esp. Labasse´e cit., §§ 38 and 75-79; BARATTA, Diritti fondamentali cit.
(62) See for instance Labasse´e cit., §§ 66 ff., namely §§ 71-73. Certainly, in Labasse´e and
Mennesson, the ECtHR rejected the applicant’s claim to enforce in France the legal rela-
tionship between the intended parents and the children. Such an outcome would have
probably fully ensured a family life in France: the child would have had, in essence, the
status of a filius familias with respect to the couple. However, this part of the judgment in
favor of the French Government, starts from a clear factual premise that helps to explain the
outcome: a minimum level of protection of family life had been guaranteed in France, given
that the national authorities, regardless of the denial of the transcription of the US certifi-
cations in the French public registers, had attached to the same certifications a set of legally
significant consequences. Despite the absence of recognition in France of a legal parent-
child relationship established abroad, in its defense the State argued that, first, it had not
actually violated the right to family life since certificates of French nationalities to the
children had been issued; secondly, the minors could not be removed from France; thirdly,
the intended parents enjoyed full parental responsibility on the basis of foreign civil-status
documents; fourthly, in case of divorce the family-affairs judge would determine their place
of residence and the contact rights of the parents as named in the foreign civil status
document; fifthly, inheritance rights would be ensured by French civil law (see Mennesson
cit., § 71 and 74). Ultimately, French authorities considered the American certificates as
being capable of producing some legal effects, even if their recognition and enforcement
were denied as regard the status filii relationship between the child and the intended
parents. Had the French authorities not accorded such minimal safeguards and had they
deconstructed the core of the right to family life, namely preventing intentional parents and
children from sharing a minimum of family life, the ECtHR would have likely ruled diffe-
rently. It, in fact, seems to appreciate the sensitivity shown by the French authorities
towards family life situations that are, socially and emotionally, quite delicate. The impres-
sion is that French judges and local government authorities made use of interpretative
techniques and practices to surreptitiously ensure an intangible nucleus of protection, even
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Finally, the functioning of national PIL systems is no doubt affec-
ted: the fair balance between different interests is focused on the need
to preserve the individual’s existence or identity, which is paramount
with respect to the legitimate aims of the State as a whole. (63) Arguably,
the deference accorded to Member States in order to forge their own
public policy principles cannot amount to a violation of the rights to
family and private life. In a nutshell, in the ECtHR’s perspective, the
more that conventional human rights are uniformly protected, the more
the margin appreciation doctrine is limited, and the less national au-
thorities are allowed to rely on their own national principles in shaping
PIL systems.
ii) Ensuring the best interests of the child
States’ margin of appreciation in construing a national ordre public
exception is further constrained by the need to ensure the best interests
of the child. In fact the weight that this notion deserves is crucial
whenever the situation of a child is at issue. Normative choices impea-
ching recognition of adoptions or filiations duly acquired abroad must
not only strike a fair balance between state interests and those of indi-
viduals that would be affected by a refusal: in assessing the situation of
though they rejected the validity of the parent-child relationship; surreptitiously, because
they come to a result, legally relevant in French law, that seems hard to reconcile with the
general operation of the French PIL mechanisms. Be that as it may, the family group
between the concerned persons (children and the relevant couples) had been effectively
guaranteed in France. In terms of respect for the right to family life, the European Court
considered it as sufficient.
(63) On the contrary, EU law justifies recourse to the concept of public policy to
dismiss a recognition by a Member State of some elements of the surname of a national
of that State, as determined in another Member State – in which that national resides – at
the time of his or her adoption as an adult by a national of that other Member State. In
Wittgenstein, the ECJ held that national authorities are allowed a margin of discretion,
within the limits imposed by the treaties, to construe their own public policy exception if
it necessary and proportionate. Given that in accordance with Art. 4(2) TEU, the European
Union is to respect the national identities of its Member States, which include the status of
the State as a Republic, the ECJ held that it is not disproportionate for a Member State to
seek to attain the objective of protecting the principle of equal treatment by prohibiting any
acquisition, possession or use, by its nationals, of titles of nobility or noble elements which
may create the impression that the bearer of the name is holder of such a rank. “By refusing
to recognize the noble elements of a name such as that of the applicant in the main
proceedings, the Austrian authorities responsible for civil status matters do not appear to
have gone further than is necessary in order to ensure the attainment of the fundamental
constitutional objective pursued by them” (judgment of 22 December 2010, case C-208/09,
Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein, § 93).
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a child, national authorities are also expected to let his best interests
prevail. (64)
The ECtHR’s reference to the notion of the best interests of the child,
contained in a number of international instruments, and primarily in the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, does not come as a surpri-
se. (65) Several cases provide a high-profile illustration of that. In Wagner,
the European Court appreciated that a Luxembourg Court had recogni-
zed a Peruvian decision producing the effect of a full adoption in Luxem-
bourg. Yet it did not seem to welcome the fact that another national
Court, in the very Wagner case, had disregarded the same legal status,
which – as the European Court highlighted – falls within the meaning of
family life under Article 8. Indeed, it noticed that the best interests of the
child ought to be taken into consideration, as well as the need to give the
child the most favourable status. This conclusion, the ECtHR pointed out,
would not have been “prejudicial to Luxembourg’s international public
policy”. (66)
Moreover, in Labasse´e, the ECHR admitted, first, that the non-
recognition in France of the status filii amounts to an ethical choice,
which results in the use of the exception of international public policy
and, second, that it is acceptable that France may wish to deter its
nationals from going abroad so as to benefit from methods of assisted
reproduction prohibited in its own territory. (67) Nonetheless, the im-
plications of this approach concern also “the children themselves, who-
se right to respect for their private life… is substantially affected. Ac-
cordingly, a serious question arises as to the compatibility of that situa-
(64) E.B. v. France, Application No 43546/02, (Grand Chamber) judgment of 22
January 2008, §§ 76 and 95.
(65) Indeed, the Strasbourg Court has emphasized in its decisions that it has never
considered the ECHR provisions as the only legal reference framework. On the contrary, it
has focused on its obligation to also consider all available provisions and principles of
international law applicable to the Contracting States. This approach is clear since it held
that the ECHR should not be interpreted in isolation and must be applied in accordance
with the principles of international law. Indeed, according to its case-law under Art. 31 §
3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, it points out the need to take
into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between the
parties, including those relating to the international protection of human rights (see Golder
v. the United Kingdom, Application No 4451/70, judgment of 21 February 1975, § 29;
Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Application Nos 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98,
judgment (Grand Chamber) of 22 March 2001, § 90 ff.; and Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
Application No 35763/97, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 21 November 2001, § 55).
(66) See Wagner case cit., § 134.
(67) See Labasse´e case cit., §§ 62 and 63.
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tion with the children’s best interests, respect for which must guide any
decision in that regard”.
Albeit within a different factual background, even the Paradiso and
Campanelli judgment amounts to shrinking the scope of the public order
exception. (68) In the European Court’s vision, ordre public cannot repre-
sent a carte blanche to justify, vis-a`-vis the obligations imposed by Article 8
ECHR, any measure concerning a child without having first considered his
concrete best interests. (69) The ECtHR found a violation of Article 8
because the Italian authorities had decided to remove the child from the
host family. Indeed, such an order is, according to the Court, a measure of
last resort that State authorities may adopt only to protect the child from
an immediate danger. Tellingly, the Court highlighted the necessity “to
ensure that a child is not disadvantaged on account of the fact that he or
she was born to a surrogate mother, especially in terms of citizenship or
identity, which are of crucial importance”. (70)
4. As discussed, the impact of international law standards on the
national conflict of laws systems is substantial. Human rights law, as
interpreted and applied by international jurisdictions, does affect and
ultimately forges the functioning of PIL in a specific manner. It is here
argued that fundamental rights prescribe an inherent and positive obli-
gation of result to recognize and enforce a family relationship duly
created abroad. This approach means, firstly a derogation from the
proceedings for recognition and enforcement set forth in the national
system of PIL, and secondly a positive obligation to be fulfilled by
public authorities. The analysis is built upon three key conceptual
foundations.
(68) Paradiso and Campanelly v. Italy, Application No 25358/12, judgment of 25
January 2015 (the case is still pending because it was referred to the Grand Chamber on
1 June 2015). The case concerned a violation of Art. 8 ECHR because Italian authorities
first refused recognition of the Russian birth certificate establishing the legal parent-child
relationship entered in the civil status registers, secondly, they suspended parental rights,
and finally ordered the removal of the child from the applicant’s household. In that case, an
Italian married couple had entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with a Russian
company, but no genetic link between the couple and the child was established.
(69) Ivi, § 80.
(70) Ivi, § 85.
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i) Consequent implications of respecting rights to private and family life
in PIL matters
The rights to effective respect for private and family life create a
negative obligation on the part of States to refrain from unduly interfering
with them. A waiver of the normal functioning of the PIL systems is the
logical outcome, given that the denial of a foreign family or personal status
resulting from the national PIL system is none other than an undue in-
terference with family and private rights. (71) This is clear if, for instance,
one looks at what happened in Luxembourg in Wagner, and in France as
regards actions for recognition of status filii of a child born by virtue of
international surrogacy arrangements. (72)
Effective respect for private and family rights produces a direct impact
in the domestic legal order in the sense that individuals enjoy rights that
national judges are expected to guarantee (unless, as seen above, a specific,
necessary and proportionate limitation occurs). Once incorporated into
domestic law, the respect for such rights entails for the national judges
the obligation to secure full effect to human rights provisions. It ensues
that they have primacy over incompatible rules of domestic law, without
waiting for their explicit abrogation by the national legislature. (73) In
other words, they are enforceable against the States responsible for the
violation within their respective domestic legal order. (74) As such, inter-
(71) BUCHER, La famille en droit international prive´ cit., p. 98 ff.; BARATTA, La recon-
naissance des situations personnelles et familiales cit., p. 408 ff.
(72) Deviations to the French PIL system are clearly implied if one looks at the
conclusions reached by the French authorities in surrogacy cases: notwithstanding the
absence of recognition in France of a legal parent-child relationship established abroad,
in its defense the State argued that, first, it had not actually violated the right to family life
since certificates of French nationalities to the children had been issued; secondly, the
minors could not be removed from France; thirdly, the intended parents enjoyed full
parental rights on the basis of foreign civil-status documents; fourthly, in case of divorce
the family-affairs judge would determine their place of residence and the contact rights of
the parents as named in the foreign civil status document; fifthly, inheritance rights would
be ensured by French civil law.
(73) See mutatis mutandis, Vermeire v. Belgium¸ Application No 12849/87, judgment of
29 November 1991, §§ 25 and 26. In Dumitru Popescu v. Roumanie, Application No 71525/
01, judgment of 26 April 2007, the ECtHR held further that “le statut confe´re´ a` la Con-
vention en droit interne permet justement aux juridictions nationales d’e´carter – ex officio
ou a` la demande des parties – les dispositions du droit interne qu’elles jugent incompatibles
avec la Convention et ses protocoles additionnels” (§ 104). As regards the nature of obli-
gations flowing from human rights treaties Human Rights Committee, General Comment
31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004).
(74) This approach is quite different to the phenomenon of Drittwirkung in the sense
that human rights, as it is asserted, might be enforceable against another individual: see
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national human rights standards demand States prescriptively ensure that
they fulfill and protect such rights.
That is so in particular for any PIL proceedings undertaken by public
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, concerning the family
status of a child: they must ensure primary consideration to his best inte-
rests on a case by case basis. (75) It is a right internationally guaranteed by
a quasi-universal instrument and embedded, as it is often advocated, in a
self-executing provision, (76) though this assumption is debatable. In any
case, where implemented into domestic law, ensuring the best interests of
the child amounts to a right that is enforceable by individuals in the
national courts since it produces effects in the legal relationship between
States and their subjects. (77)
ii) The concept of positive obligation implies a result-oriented construc-
tion of the PIL systems
Effective enjoyment of fundamental rights in PIL matters may not be
reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely
negative conception would not be consistent with the object and purpose
of international instruments, which compel States to secure a given human
right in the sense that its enjoyment is to be effective. (78) Since the notion
of respect implies – in a Kantian perspective – that individuals should
actually be the center of society, as well as ends in themselves, and not
CLAPHAM, The “Drittwirkung” of the Convention, in MCDONALD, MATSCHER, PETZOLD (eds.),
The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Dordrecht, Boston, London,
1993, p. 163 ff.
(75) Art. 3(1) Convention on the Rights of the Child; Vienna Declaration (June 1993)
World Conference on Human Rights (in R. WALLACE, International Human Rights. Text and
Materials, London, 1997, p. 210).
(76) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-ninth session, Supplement No. 41 (A/69/
41), Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, New York, 2014,
p. 1. 193 States have actually ratified it. As to the notion of “best interests of the child”, see
for different approaches ALSTON (ed.), The Best Interests of the Child, Oxford, 1994; BREEN,
The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child, The Hague-London-New York, 2002;
FOCARELLI, La Convenzione di New York sui diritti del fanciullo e il concetto di “best interests
of the child”, in Riv. dir. int., 2010, p. 981 ff.; BUCK, International Child Law, 3rd ed.,
London, 2005, passim.
(77) COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILDREN, General comment No. 14 (2013) on
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3,
para. 1), United Nations CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013, p. 4. As far as France is concerned,
see BUREAU, MUIR WATT, Droit international prive´ cit., p. 171.
(78) HARRIS, O’BOYLE, WARBRICK, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights,
3rd ed., Oxford, 2014, p. 504.
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means for something else, (79) respect for the rights to private and family life
leads to a positive obligation being imposed on the national authorities.
Consequently, the required State should in principle recognize and enfor-
ce a personal status or a family tie, so as to protect it whenever it duly
exists abroad. (80) In other words, the concept of positive obligation fur-
ther entails a duty for the State to forge its PIL provisions so as to make
them result-oriented: if a family tie or status is duly established in a foreign
legal order, the national authority, seized for its recognition or enforce-
ment, is bound to take the interpretative postures in its power to secure
the internationally guaranteed rights to private and family life. (81) Where
necessary, States also have to adopt the legislative, administrative and
adjudicatory measures to preserve the effective enjoyment of such rights
within their territory, (82) while considering that under international law
(79) The German philosopher Kant argued that persons are ends in themselves, with
an absolute dignity to be respected (KANT, Stato di diritto e societa` civile (a cura di MERKER),
Roma, 1982, p. 144 ff.). See also EEKELAAR, Family Law and Personal Life cit., advocating
that the word “respect” gives to the notion of right to respect for private and family life “the
character of a statement that family life has a timeless quality and is to be held to have value
in and of itself” (at 81).
(80) Indeed, the Strasbourg Court held that a violation of positive obligations occurred
when, in its judgment relating to a request for enforcement, a national court failed to take
into account the social reality of the family, which existed between the applicants. While
looking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individuals who
requested the enforcement of a foreign judgment and those of the State, which aims to
set limits to preserve the society as a whole, the European Court emphasized the need to
consider the social reality and the existence of family ties legally acquired abroad (see
Wagner case cit., § 129 s.). The principle of “positive obligation” stemming from Conven-
tional provision is well established in the ECtHR jurisprudence: see Airey v. Ireland, Ap-
plication No 6289/73, judgment of 9 October 1979, esp. § 25; Marckx v. Belgium cit.; case
of Plattform “Arzte fu¨r das Leben” v. Austria, Application No 10126/82, judgment of 21
June 1988, §§ 31 and 32; Kroon and others v. The Netherlands, Application No 18535791,
judgment of 27 October 1994, § 30; X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, Application No 21830/
93, judgment of 22 April 1997, § 37. HEYMANN-DOAT, Le respect des droits de l’homme dans
les relations prive´es, in TEITGEN-COLLY (ed.), Cinquantie`me anniversaire de la Convention
europe´enne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, 2002, p. 219 ff.; BARTOLE, DE SENA, ZAGREBEL-
SKY, Commentario breve cit., p. 303 ff.; HERINGA, ZWAAK, Right to respect for privacy, in VAN
DIJK, VAN HOOF, VAN RIJN, ZWAAK (eds.), Theory and Practice cit., p. 739 ff.; SUDRE, Droit
europe´en cit., p. 370 ff.; HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, Law of the European Convention cit.,
p. 21, 504 ff.
(81) See however, KINSCH, Droits de l’homme, droits fondamentaux et droit international
prive´, in Recueil des cours, t. 318, 2006, p. 149 ff.
(82) In Ignaccolo-Zenide v. Romenia, Application No 31679/96, judgment of 25 January
1996, § 108, the ECtHR held that: ‘(I)t is for each Contracting State to equip itself with
adequate and effective means to ensure compliance with its positive obligations under Art. 8
of the Convention’.
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the European Court’s judgments are usually not directly enforceable but
must be implemented into the national legal order. (83)
In this human rights based perspective, PIL requirements must then
be re-shaped, where possible by interpretation, to safeguard the child’s
fundamental rights, when the relevant case is about a child’s integration in
his adoptive family or in the family of intended parents. (84) Derogations to
the usual functioning of PIL, and the subsequent positive obligation of
result, appear of vital importance if fundamental rights are to be interpre-
ted and applied in a manner that renders them practical and effective, and
not just theoretical or illusory – to borrow a language frequently used in
the ECtHR’s case law. Classic family PIL requirements for recognition and
enforcement of foreign civil status should not necessarily be a legitimate
(83) KELLER AND MARTI, Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the
Execution of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments, in Eur. Journ. Int. Law, 2015,
p. 829 ff.
(84) The Author has suggested a similar rationale as regards the construction of an
implied principle of mutual recognition of personal and family status within the EU system,
for it is necessary to respect the right to family and private life enshrined in Art. 7 (cfr.
BARATTA, Verso la “comunitarizzazione” cit.; ID., Problematic elements of an implicit rule
providing for mutual recognition of personal and family status in the EC, in IPRax, 2007,
p. 4 ff.; ID., La reconnaissance internationale cit., p. 411 ff.; as regards the jurisprudence of
the ECJ see judgment of 2 December 1997, case C-36/94, Dafeki, this Rivista, 1999, p. 340
ff.; 14 October 2008, case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul, ibidem, 2009, p. 221 ff., both
concerning recognition of public decrees on civil status and names of individuals). In
Grunkin and Paul the ECJ held that obliging a person who has exercised his right to move
and reside freely in the territory of another Member State to use a surname in the Member
State of which he a national, which is different from that already conferred and registered in
the Member State of birth and residence, is liable to hamper the exercise of the right
established in Art. 21 TFEU to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States (Grunkin and Paul, §§ 21 and 22; see also judgment of 2 October 2003, case C-148/
02, Garcia Avello, ibidem, 2003, p. 1088 ff., § 36). Then, it held that such serious inconve-
nience may likewise arise where the child concerned holds the nationality of only one
Member State, but that State of origin refuses to recognize the family name acquired by
the child in the State of birth and residence (ivi, § 24). Arguably, in the EU – however
fragmented its legislation in the field of civil justice may be – the erosion of national
competences follows as a matter of course. The EU aims to set up a common space in
which inter alia fundamental rights and mutual recognition play a major role. Thus, a
supranational system of PIL is gradually being forged with the aim of ensuring the conti-
nuity of legal relationships duly created in a Member State. As a result, domestic systems of
PIL are deemed to become complementary in character. Their conceptualization as a kind
of inter-local rules, the application of which cannot raise obstacles to the continuity princi-
ple, appears logically conceivable. See HONORATI, Free Circulation of Names for EU Citizens,
in Dir. Un. eur., 2009, p. 379 ff.; TONOLO, Il riconoscimento di atti e provvedimenti stranieri
concernenti il diritto al nome nell’ordinamento italiano: problemi e prospettive, in HONORATI
(ed.), Diritto al nome e all’identita` personale nell’ordinamento europeo, Milan, 2010, p. 151
ff.; NASCIMBENE, Le traite´ de Lisbonne et l’espa`ce judiciaire europe´en: le principe de confiance
re´ciproque et de reconnaissance mutuelle, in Revue des Aff. Eur., n. 4, 2011, p. 787 ff.
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normative bar to the recognition of foreign family and personal status
within the territory of the requested State.
Deference to State policies and in particular to their ordre public
exception – implied in the margin of appreciation doctrine – do not
allow normative results inconsistent with individual rights. That is re-
gardless of whether there is a common trend amongst States or, on the
contrary, whether different approaches feature States’ practice as re-
gards a given social situation. The crucial point is likely not a contrac-
tion of the State margin of appreciation in determining its own funda-
mental values, as some indications of the ECtHR seem to point out.
What matters is rather that the level of protection of fundamental rights
be carried around common international values as arising from interna-
tional instruments. As a result, the domestic jurisdiction must be open
to judgments delivered abroad and more generally to foreign normative
values. This leads to a concept of international public policy with strong
transnational contours because it is founded not on the necessity to
preserve the internal coherence of the forum, but rather on the need
to make it permeable by human rights values as they are internationally
shared and accepted.
iii) The principle of continuity and the “best interests of the child”
If the required State is to act in a manner to enable a family tie or
status to be developed in the forum as it stands abroad, the underlying
rationale is that there should be, at least in principle, a line of continuity
between the legal situation created in the State of origin and the domestic
legal order, (85) irrespective of whether the requirements for recognition
laid down in the latter point in an opposite direction. In that respect,
international protection of human rights begins to emerge as a standard-
unifying approach in family PIL. The room for legal relativism, which is
typical of conflict of laws, is reduced insofar as international standards
operate as a source of unity.
Whenever a status or a family tie duly created abroad is characterized
by a solid element of effectiveness, PIL procedures must also take into
account the social reality of the situation whose recognition (or enforce-
(85) According to the principles set out by the ECtHR in its case-law, where the
existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State is bound to allow that
tie to be developed and to establish legal provisions that render possible the child’s inte-
gration in his family (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx v. Belgium cit., p. 15, § 31; Kroon
and Others v. The Netherlands cit., § 32, 36-40).
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ment) is sought. (86) It is worth noting that international courts do not
consider the fact that quite often the applicants do make recourse to
recognition or enforcement techniques in order to circumvent domestic
law prohibitions or restrictions. Criticisms in terms of fraude a` la loi,
though theoretically conceivable under a typical PIL reasoning, are down-
graded vis-a`-vis the obligation to preserve human rights as internationally
guaranteed.
Further the principle of continuity is featured by another crucial ele-
ment, which has been strongly emerging from international practice, i.e.
the “best interests of the child”. It means his real and genuine interest in
any specific situation, e.g. when interpreting the institutions of adoption
and filiation in PIL. Actually, any decision on the care for a child must be
based on a pragmatic assessment of the child’s concrete welfare, while
taking into account every element of the case, as even some national case
law indicates. (87) It would be highly questionable, for instance, to reco-
(86) See Wagner cit., § 132.
(87) For instance, English judges have granted a parental order in favor of a British
couple that had entered into a motherhood surrogacy contract with a Ukrainian woman.
Two children were born and conceived by the husband’s gametes and the eggs of an
anonymous donor. The English Court, despite the fact that the contract did not respond
to the gratuity requirement imposed by UK legislation in such situations, focused on the
welfare of children and on the negative consequences to which both would have been
exposed in the event of a negative ruling. It held that “What the court is required to do
is to balance two competing and potentially irreconcilably conflicting concepts. Parliament
is clearly entitled to legislate against commercial surrogacy and is clearly entitled to expect
that the courts should implement that policy consideration in its decisions. Yet it is also
recognized that as the full rigor of that policy consideration will bear on one wholly
unequipped to comprehend it let alone deal with its consequences (i.e. the child concerned)
that rigor must be mitigated by the application of a consideration of that child’s welfare.
That approach is both humane and intellectually coherent. The difficulty is that it is almost
impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case comes to court,
the welfare of any child (particularly a foreign child) would not be gravely compromised (at
the very least) by a refusal to make an order” ([2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), Re: X & Y
(Foreign Surrogacy), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/ 2008/3030.html). Fur-
ther, “given the effect of a parental order is to confer status for life, it is difficult to see
how applying any principle other than welfare with a ‘lifelong’ perspective would be apt in
deciding the final discretionary stage of a Section 30 application. I am wholly satisfied on
that approach that the welfare of these children will best be served by the making of the
parental order sought by these applicants” (ivi, § 24). Even an Italian judge recognized
English parental orders with which an Anglo - Italian couple had been assigned in England
a parenting status of two children born in 1997 and 2000 through a surrogate motherhood
practice. The intended parents had concluded contracts providing for no compensation,
according to which a woman led the pregnancy of a fertilized embryo with the husband’s
gametes of the same couple. The issue concerning recognition was raised many years after
birth when the Italian woman returned to her home country following the dissolution of the
marriage. The relationship between the children and the mother therefore presented, in this
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gnize and enforce a biological parenthood relationship acquired abroad
through surrogacy if the intended parents are elderly or had recourse to
such practice for purely selfish motives. A genetic link per se may not
establish a sufficient reason to comply with the best interests of the child
criterion, unless it is accompanied by a serious commitment to advance the
child’s welfare throughout his life. The parent’s interests alone, though
based on a genetic link, seem weaker and secondary. These may be per-
sonal and human legitimate aspirations, yet they should be considered as a
lesser element in relation to the beneficial effects for the child concerned.
In any case, in international commercial surrogacy, the fundamental rights
of other persons may be affected, since these arrangements can imply, in
particular, the sale of a child under Article 35 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the exploitation of surrogate mothers. (88) Moreo-
ver, the latter’s rights to be informed and to give the necessary consent for
medical procedures (which may be freely withdrawn at any time) have to
be respected. (89) Therefore, de iure condendo a large multilateral interna-
tional convention should conveniently address these issues. (90)
case, also a solid character of effectiveness according to the Court of Appeal of Bari, 13
February 2009, this Rivista, 2009, p. 698 ff., with a critical comments of CAMPIGLIO, Lo stato
di figlio nato da contratto internazionale di maternita`, ivi, p. 599 ff.
(88) TOBIN, To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (Human) Rights Response to the Practice
of International Commercial Surrogacy, in Int. Comp. Law Quart., 2014, p. 317 ff.; PUPPINCK,
DE LA HOUGUE, Quelles voies de droit international pour interdire la maternite´ de substituion,
2015, passim; BAREL, ARMELLINI, Manuale breve di diritto internazionale privato, 2011, p.
163; ALLAN, The Surrogate in Commercial Surrogacy: Legal and Ethical Considerations, in
GERBER, O’BYRNE (eds.), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights, London-New York, 2015, p.
113 ff.; VETTOREL, International Surrogacy Arrangements: Recent Developments and Ongoing
Problems, this Rivista, 2015, p. 526 ff.
(89) See the so-called Oviedo Convention (1997), Convention for the protection of
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology
and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Arts 5 and 10.
(90) It should not only be capable of addressing the international market of surrogacy
(which is growing: see HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, A Preliminary
Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy cit., p. 8, and HAUSAMMANN, HITZ
QUENON, Maternite´ de substitution: la perspective des droits humains, in Centre suisse de
compe´tence pour les droits humains, Newsletter CSDH of 11 May 2014) but it could also
conveniently address the need to protect the fundamental rights of all the persons. It could
possibly prohibit any forms of international commercial surrogacy so as to block “the
practice of gestational surrogacy which involves reproductive exploitation and use of the
human body for financial or other gain” (Report on the Annual Report on Human Rights and
Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2015/
2229(INI)), par. 114. Indeed, the European Parliament has condemned “the practice of
surrogacy, which undermines the human dignity of the woman since her body and its
reproductive functions are used as a commodity; considers that the practice of gestational
surrogacy which involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for financial
roberto baratta 439
Quite delicate is also the issue concerning the recognition of the status
filii in favour of same-sex couples having become parents through inter-
national surrogacy arrangements, in particular for States that prevent ac-
cess to parenthood in such situations, including though adoption. In this
regard, so far there is no specific trend in international case law. A further
elaboration on these matters will require assessments from the viewpoint
of social dignity and the principle of non-discrimination based on sexual
orientations. Yet national case law is varied and there is no clear trend that
is emerging. (91)
As a rule, the principle of the best interests of the child should prevail
and guide the administration of justice in national courts. Judiciary power
is expected to value the superior interests of the child as a primary criterion
for defining the child’s place in family PIL. If refusing the recognition of a
family situation duly acquired abroad adversely affects the best interests of
the child concerned, a national court, when applying its own system of
PIL, should uphold the legal status validly created abroad, corresponding
to family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion. (92) To summarize on this point, respect for family and private life, as
or other gain, in particular in the case of vulnerable women in developing countries, shall be
prohibited and treated as a matter of urgency in human rights instruments”. See however,
for a different approach, TRIMMINGS, BEAUMONT (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements
cit., 647 (sustain the idea of regulating international commercial surrogacy, being it more
pragmatic). See also WELLS-GRECO, The status of Children Arising from Inter-Country Sur-
rogacy Arrangements, The Hague, 2015.
(91) In Belgium, a male same-sex couple had twin babies through surrogacy in Cali-
fornia and returned home with a birth certificate naming both of them as parents. The
Belgian registry office refused to register the US birth certificates. In the first instance the
Belgian Court determined that the recognition of the US birth certificates violated the
national ordre public, focusing also on the fact that circumvention of Belgian parentage
and adoption laws could not subsequently be legitimized. Non-recognition of the twins’
US birth certificates meant that in Belgium the US surrogate mother is regarded as the
child’s legal parent, whereas in the US the Belgian fathers are regarded as the child’s legal
parents. On appeal, the Lie`ge Court of Appeal ordered that the birth certificates be reco-
gnized and registered at the civil registry, but only as far as the legal relationship with the
biological father was concerned. The registration of the legal parenthood of the biological
father’s husband was not possible, as he was not a biological parent (see VONK, BOELE-
WOELKI, Surrogacy and Same-sex Couples in The Netherlands cit., p. 137). Likewise, see
Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), 2 February 2015, No 245/2012, in http://www.po-
derjudicial.es,with interesting arguments concerning how to strike a right balance between
the respect for fundamental rights and the prohibition of surrogacy in Spain and comments
by DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, El nuevo Auto del Tribunal Supremo sobre gestacio´n por sustitucio´n y
la evolucio´n de la jurisprudencia europea, in http://pedrodemiguelasensio.blogspot.com.es/
2015/03/el-nuevo-auto-del-tribunal-supremo.html#more.
(92) See Wagner cit., § 133. See also Italian case law mentioned by TUO, The Italian
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internationally guaranteed, requires the consideration of the social reality
of the situation, having in mind the best interests of the child.
5. It is traditional to present conflict of laws as a system of national
decision-making inherently linked to private law and ideologically neutral.
Nowadays this picture is far too simplistic and inadequate for our modern
era, which is producing another framework. International human rights
are important factors for transforming family PIL, since the latter has to
measure up to the standards set by the former, like any domestic field of
law should. Therefore, respect for family and private life, as internationally
guaranteed, shows that dealing with cases having a foreign element is less
and less declinable in terms of a self-contained regime merely defined by
reference to the classic definitional categories and techniques of national
law. International instruments and practice require the departure from the
normal functioning of domestic conflict of laws, namely of its recognition
and enforcement techniques. It follows that family PIL, being subject to a
compatibility test with the rights to private and family life, entails a posi-
tive obligation of result aimed at recognizing family status duly acquired
abroad.
The influence of international human rights on the conflict of laws is
evolving because it tends to bring family PIL systems in a context that is
being progressively framed around common principles. Family PIL is not
ontologically different from any other field of national law. It is subject to
the inevitable oversight of international European standards on human
rights. Rather than fearing the fragmentation of PIL, it would be appro-
priate to consider this ongoing process in terms of a natural evolution and
harmonization of the legal systems. In other words, the classic concept
according to which PIL assumes juridical relativism as a precondition of
its almost unfailing pillar, is subjected to some erosion given the impact of
fundamental rights.
The structural principles of PIL are affected. (93) To tackle this chal-
lenge, national recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions should be
re-shaped around common principles to avoid clashes with the individual
need to enjoy a sole family status throughout territories of different States.
Regime of Recognition of Intercountry Adoption of Children in Light of the ECHR: What
About Singles?, in Cuad. Der. Transn., 2015, n. 2, p. 357 ff.
(93) JAYME, Il diritto internazionale privato nel sistema comunitario e i suoi recenti
sviluppi normativi nei rapporti con Stati terzi, this Rivista, 2006, p. 353 ff., is aware of this
ongoing process, raising some critical observations.
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The primary role of law, including the discipline of conflict of laws, is to
achieve a fair regulation of human society and of its related needs. It goes
without saying that the philosophic debate on law and justice contains a
double dimension, i.e. ethical and legal. However, the question on PIL
justice must be enhanced if this discipline is understood as a means to
pursue the fundamental rights of the individual concerned so as to ensure,
namely in the field of family, the continuity of personal and family status
throughout the frontiers, i.e. the possession d’e´tat beyond a pure national
dimension. In that perspective, the distributive justice of PIL cannot but
have a secondary and indirect importance since the law, and PIL is no
exception, should as a rule pursue the realization of human rights as
internationally guaranteed. In order to achieve this intrusion of internatio-
nal law in family PIL, its methodologies for securing the recognition of
foreign judgments and public acts in the jurisdiction of the required State
are appropriate instruments, capable of ensuring the continuity of perso-
nal and family status throughout national borders.
Moreover, the rights of children have acquired a relevant dimension.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has proclaimed the child’s
right to preserve their identity, including their nationality, name and family
relationships. (94) Thus it is not a surprise that in filiation and adoption
cases the leitmotiv is primarily set in the child’s interests, and not in the
parent’s. A judicial policy of child first implying a primacy of child’s rights
appears the ultimate point de repe`re given that he or she is the most
vulnerable.
Enhancing the recognition of personal and family status legitimately
acquired abroad enables the circulation of different family models. This is
all the more true within the European Union. (95) It follows that overall
(94) Arts 7 and 8 UNCRC.
(95) In the EU, is theoretically conceivable that the EU citizens moving to another
Member State expect their personal status and family relationships to be recognized by that
State, irrespective of the continued existence of divergences between both the family laws of
the Member States and domestic conflict of laws solutions as to the existence or validity of a
given personal status or family relationship. The principle of mutual recognition in civil
matters assumes a particular value in a common judicial area. It is aimed at realizing not only
the judicial protection of rights guaranteed by the treaties on free movement of persons,
goods and services. It is also a principle intended to give thickness to the area of freedom,
security and justice. In this perspective, the possibility of reconstructing an implied principle
of continuity founded on mutual recognition appears all the more important. It could inter
alia ensure, regardless of secondary rules that make it operational, the free movement
people in a fundamental rights based perspective, able to insert by interpretation the
necessary corrective measures to national conflict systems. It is worth adding that the
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national legal orders may even have inconsistent determinations. While
maintaining their punitive postures as regards, in particular, the commer-
cial practices of surrogacy, or adoptions by unmarried persons, family PIL
systems cannot bluntly dismiss the recognition and enforcement of a fa-
mily status duly acquired abroad when it is founded on a biological tie. As
discussed, under certain conditions, fundamental rights as internationally
guaranteed prevent States from doing so.
Admittedly, that trend is not without contention in domestic legal
orders, quite often mirroring the very different legal traditions within
Europe. Personal and family laws are areas of high sensitivity and such
processes can be opposed – as they often are – for fears of contamination
and, ultimately, of fragmentation of national conflict systems, jeopardizing
also their own internal and long-standing coherence. (96) As it is inevitable
and comprehensible, national fears are voiced due to interference with
domestic ethical principles, as the issue of recognition of status filii related
to surrogate motherhood dramatically demonstrates. (97)
Yet the overall impact of fundamental rights on family PIL does not
mean weakening of the discipline of the conflict of laws. Interestingly, it
enriches PIL and its ways of functioning. Individuals and their fundamen-
tal rights come at the center of legal analysis. Under this approach, the
related normative values and ideals may be and progressively become
common to different PIL systems.
principle of mutual recognition is also conditional to the right to effective access to justice
(Art. 81(e) TFEU) which is directly tied to Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
(96) It seems increasingly clear that the analysis of family ties in a mere PIL perspective,
especially if it focused in its technicalities, is insufficient to take into account a complex legal
reality which is permeated by the need to ensure certain rights and individual freedoms, and
namely the respect of family and private life. It has been correctly remarked that a sound
approach to transnational households requires an interdisciplinary perspective (ISAILOVIC´,
The ECtHR and the Regulation of Transnational Surrogacy Agreements, in ejiltalk.org).
(97) It is hardly a surprise that sometimes the evolution of case law raises severe critical
comments. For instance, issues of deep ethical, moral, philosophical and religious concern
loom large when a plurality of adult figures, conflicting at times with each other, aspires to
the possession of the parenthood as regards the same child born by surrogacy. In point of
law, in the absence of written rules, the interpreter is called upon to envisage appropriate
conceptual constructions to respond to social and medical science that are dramatically
dynamic and still evolving. A deep reflection is needed in that respect when foundational
principles of family law are challenged by the new frontiers of medical science that tends to
give access to parenthood without limits (see also GRUENBAUM, Foreign Surrogate Mother-
hood: Mater Semper Certa Erat, in Am. Journ. Comp. Law, 2012, p. 745 ff.).
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ABSTRACT: International human rights are important factors in the sha-
ping of private international law in family matters. In fact, the latter has to
measure up to the standards set by the former, like any domestic field of law
should. Accordingly, respect for family and private life, as internationally
guaranteed, shows that a self-contained regime merely defined by reference
to the classic definitional categories and techniques of national law is less
and less suitable to deal with cross-border cases. In essence this paper, while
considering cross-border cases and international practice, argues that funda-
mental rights prescribe an inherent and positive obligation of result to reco-
gnize and enforce a family relationship lawfully created abroad. This ap-
proach entails, firstly, a derogation from the proceedings for recognition
and enforcement set forth in the national system of PIL, and, secondly, a
positive obligation to be fulfilled by public authorities. In this human-rights-
based perspective, PIL requirements must then be re-shaped, where possible
by means of interpretation, to safeguard the fundamental rights of the indi-
viduals concerned.
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